A Life Wasted

Computer Centre One

I'd spoken to the Commodore Regional Direction numerous times on the phone before he agreed to meet me.  During those conversations he made it abundantly clear that before I could be approved as a Commodore dealer I had to be approved by him, have my business facility approved and I had to purchase $25,000 in inventory, parts and promotional material.  The $25,000 had to be paid up front, it couldn't be financed, and it was a firm Commodore requirement.  If I couldn't give him a bank check for $25,000 then I would be wasting both of our time.  I never told him I had the $25,000, but I assured him I understood the terms.

I've mentioned before that I score very high in abstract reasoning.  What I am about to outline represents the first time I put this rare ability to a practical, legal use and the first time I made a conscious effort to use it.  There was no way I could afford a retail store Commodore would approve, nor could I raise $25,000.  However, I was confident I could impress the Commodore Computer's Regional Director well enough to overcome these obstacles.  I was confident of this because I was able to see the budding computer industry as few could.

It was early 1982.  I had read everything available on the new microcomputer industry (personal computer or PC wasn't a term yet) and I knew it was about to blossom, but I could also see it was at a crossroads.  Apple had released it's first product, the Apple II in 1977.  In the same year Tandy (Radio Shack) released their entry level TRS-80 and Commodore had released it's first model, the PET 4040.  Tandy and Commodore had just released updated models with more power and capability and Apple was rumored to be near doing the same with a "revolutionary new computer." Up to this point these three companies were the major players in the microcomputer business.  However, the year before a new player with lots of clout had thrown in and was threatening everyone else: IBM and their new product, the "IBM  Personal Computer." The IBM PC had been released in 1981 but wasn't as popular as the other three because the IBM PC had it's own proprietary operating system, called PC DOS, which was the IBM PC's problem.  Because this new operating system was new it lacked software.  IBM and other vendors were working hard to develop and convert software for the new IBM format, but at this point IBM PC sales were flat for this reason.

Commodore on the other hand ran on industry standard CP/M operating system.  Microcomputers were all new, but what software was available was designed for the CP/M operating system.  So in early 1982, Apple led in sales, but was stagnate because there hardware was dated, (Apple released the IIe and the Lisa a year later in 1983).  IBM's PC showed great promise and would be a serious contender in the near future.  But at the time I sat in the restaurant with the Commodore Regional Director, it was his company and Tandy who were in a position to control the new microcomputer market.  I knew it and he knew it.  Commodore was at a critical juncture.  A moment of history to be won or lost.  The future could be won by Commodore because they had the momentum.  But to win Commodore had to move now and they had to move fast.

What Commodore needed most were outlets.  Dealers to sell their product.  Commodore had just released a new business computer, the CBM-8080.  Though under rated by history, the CBM-8080 was the best business based microcomputer available in 1982.  Commodore understood this, but they also understood that to sell it they needed professional level dealers.  Youngstown was a medium sized market, but a market they weren't represented in.  To get into Youngstown, Commodore needed me.  More specifically the Regional Director needed a dealer in Youngstown.  All I had to do was convince him I was the guy he needed.  Before our meeting I had done my homework and knew this.  I had called Commodore headquarters and asked questions.  I had done something that would later be called "social engineering" to dig deep into the company and get the answers to questions they didn't want to answer. 

Without explaining how I knew all that I did, I explained Commodore's position in the industry.  I  saw Commodore as a gamble.  I picked them for this reason.  They would either dominate or die in the next two years.  I picked them because they had to take risks.  I couldn't get in the door with IBM.  Tandy was tied to their Radio Shack Stores, and Apple had an established dealer network. Commodore was perfect for me because they had a great product, but a limited time-frame to act.  I picked Commodore because they had to gamble.  I would be a roll of the dice.  I had the will and ability to succeed but I didn't have enough money to play the game.  I explained all of this to the Commodore Regional Director, then told him he could have me, but to get me he'd have to wave the $25,000 entry fee, which he could do under extraordinary circumstances.  When he asked why he should take such a risk with me I told him he'd do it because he was impressed with me and he was under pressure to open Youngstown.