Drastically Modified Combined Fleet

BATTLE OF MIDWAY | Chapter 39

War Lessons

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The Japanese people, upon learning of the results of the Battle of Wake Island, the unprecedented clash between carrier strike forces and the direct confrontation of Japanese and American battleships, had mixed feelings about whether to rejoice in the victory. This hesitation stemmed from witnessing the battle-scarred appearance of triumphant warships, including a carrier with an obliterated bridge and battleships and heavy cruisers bearing destruction marks throughout their hulls.

Certainly, the achievements in battle were undeniable. In the mid-ocean aerial combat where Japanese and American carriers collided, the Third Fleet at the time sank the Enterprise and Lexington. On the other hand, the Japanese carriers Kamikaku and Amakaku suffered damage from what seemed to be 500-kilogram bombs dropped by enemy dive bombers but did not sink. Furthermore, the carrier air squadrons of the Third Fleet achieved significant victories beyond sinking two American carriers. The D3A dive bombers destroyed numerous cruisers and destroyers, while the B5N torpedo bombers earned great distinction by sinking the battleships Arizona and Nevada. Additionally, the carrier-based fighter squadrons shot down and destroyed over a hundred enemy carrier-based planes.

In the clash between surface ships, the advantage tilted in favor of Japan. In a showdown between an equal number of Japanese and American heavy cruisers, four Mogami-class ships clashed with an equal number of New Orleans-class heavy cruisers, sinking all of them in a remarkable achievement. In the decisive battle between battleships, the Imperial Navy's six battleships sank all six American battleships without losing a single ship, dealing a decisive blow to the Pacific Fleet. In total, the First Fleet and the Third Fleet achieved remarkable results, sinking eight battleships, two carriers, four heavy cruisers, and numerous destroyers, along with damaging and destroying many cruisers and destroyers.

However, as mentioned earlier, behind these significant victories, all six battleships, including the Nagato, suffered damages ranging from moderate to severe. Additionally, two carriers were disabled. Naturally, these ships would be unusable until repairs were completed. The human cost was also severe, with over 1.000 casualties and several times that number wounded. In other words, at present, not a single operational battleship, the guardian deities of the Imperial Navy, remained. On the other hand, the United States, despite the destruction of the Pacific Fleet, still possessed nearly ten undamaged battleships. Moreover, two of them were newly built battleships surpassing the Nagato-class in firepower. It was evident to everyone that the situation was far from conducive to celebrating the victory.

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The results of the Battle of Wake Island served as a bitter lesson for the Combined Fleet command, including Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Exploiting the misconception within the US military that all new capital ships under the Circle 3 Plan were battleships, the command intentionally deployed the Second Fleet's Sōryū-class carriers conspicuously to the Philippines and Malaya, while assigning the First and Third Fleets for the interception of the Pacific Fleet.

"If they thought all the newly built ships after the treaty were battleships, they were wrong."

This strategy aimed to take advantage of the US military's misconception as a kind of surprise effect. Within the Combined Fleet command, this strategy was considered a success. In fact, the carrier air squadrons of the Third Fleet sank the two carriers, Enterprise and Lexington, and further sent the battleships Arizona and Nevada to the bottom of the sea near Wake Island. Thanks to the actions of these air squadrons, the operational goal of defending Wake Island was achieved. By annihilating the main force of the Pacific Fleet, valuable time was bought until the completion of the Southern Operations.

However, criticism arose from various sectors, with the forefront being the commanders who led the actual combat units. Vice Admiral Kuwabara, who engaged in fierce combat with the American carrier task force, and Vice Admiral Ozawa, who achieved the distinguished feat of annihilating the U.S. air force in the Philippines, were at the forefront of this criticism.

They argued that, without resorting to such tactics, simply deploying the 624 carrier-based aircraft of the Second and Third Fleets could easily have annihilated the Pacific Fleet head-on. Vice Admiral Inoue, the Navy Vice Minister, also in the same Naval Academy 37th class as Ozawa and Kuwabara, joined them in expressing agreement. They dismissed the strategy devised by the Combined Fleet command as a typical example of force dispersion under a single word.

Ozawa, the naval aviation expert, Inoue, who had early on recognized the power of aircraft and advocated the aviation transformation of the Navy, and Kuwabara, who commanded the battle between carrier strike forces in the Imperial Navy, easily outmatched the elite staff of the Combined Fleet command with their theories, experience, and sharp intellect. Ultimately, under Yamamoto's intervention, a principle was adopted for the future: the mobile fleet would concentrate its forces as much as possible for operations.